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AN EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON MARRIAGE LAWS
RIIOARD T. YOUNG*
From ancient times up to the present day there has existed
among sovereign states a traditional reluctance to legislate on
matters concerning marriage. This attitude has been due largely
to men's regard of the marital union as a personal status, some-
thing which by nature involved a considerable amount of indi-
vidual freedom. As families began living together in large com-
munities, it became necessary for social pressures in the form of
custom and church law to attach certain responsibilities to mar-
riage.' It was only after decades of unsocial practices culminated
in a general desire for change, however, that drastic legislation on
the subject appeared. 2 The decree of the Lateran Council of 1215
Innocent III, prescribing the publishing of the bans for countries
in western Europe, originated for this reasonA Similarly, the
public demand for the suppression of the Fleet marriages in Eng-
land resulted in the passing of Lord Hardwicke's Act.4
Today the attitude of the public, as well as that of most law-
making bodies, is still one of laissez faire towards this question of
marriage laws. It is only when we realize that the problem is
inherently involved with that of divorce, juvenile delinquency,
pauperism and public health that the need for more scientific mar-
riage legislation is made apparent. The appalling rate at which
divorce and crime have increased in the United States in the last
few years discloses serious deficiencies in those laws under which
the family originates.5
Divorce, for example, has increased at a tremendous rate in
recent years. According to one authority 201,468 divorces were
granted in this country in 1929, or one in every two minutes;
eighteen per cent of all American marriages or more than one in
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'See article by Judge Hoffman of Cincinnati Domestic Relations Court,
in (1929) XXX CURRENT HISTORY 877. See also article, Marriage and the
State (1911) LXXI INDEPENDENT 553-554.
2State regulation in the formative years of the common law was un-
known. Marriage was left entirely up to the church, law courts dealing
only with de facto marriages. II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed., 1923) 369-74.
3POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (2d ed., 1923)
370-71.
'I HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) 446.
'Recent Social Trends, a review of findings by President Hoover's Re-
search Committee, Introduction, pp. 1, 5 reprinted N. Y. Times, Jan.
2, 1933, Sec. 2. See also (June, 1930) LIX WORLD'S WORK 23; (1932)
CXIII LITERARY DIGEST 20.
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every six end in divorce." A contributing factor to this increasing
divorce rate and one which is traceable directly to lax marriage
laws, is the child marriage. This all too prevalent evil, condemned
universally by sociologist and public official, emphasizes one of
the weakest spots in modern marriage legislation.7 Such wide-
spread family disorganization is, of course, bound to have a direct
effect on the amount of juvenile delinquency and pauperism in
the United States. Both of these latter problems are matters of
public concern which grow more serious each year. There are also
attendant problems arising as a result of poor marriage laws, such
as the steady increase in the number of physical and mental de-
fectives. At least one per cent of our population is committed to
state or federal institutions for the unfit, while many remain at
large who should be thus confined."
As to such problems as these just mentioned, public conscious-
ness has been awakened for some years and signs of reform are
to be seen. It remains for the law-making authorities to realize
that many of the causes of the disintegration of the family unit
originate at the time of the formation of the marriage status.
Scientific laws on marriage, reasonably administered, can do a
great deal towards eliminating those more pressing social problems
which find their way to domestic relation courts, charitable organ-
izations and state penal institutions.
The changing viewpoint of the courts on this subject is forcibly
pointed out in the early Washington case of In Re McLaughlin's
Estate,9 in which our court declared the common-law marriage to
be prohibited in this state as being against public policy. In the
course of his opinion, Justice Scott made the following statement:
"There is a growing belief that the welfare of society
demands further restrictions in this direction, and that
this will find voice in future legislation; that an institu-
tion of this kind, which is so closely and thoroughly re-
lated to the state should be most carefully guarded, and
that improvident and improper marriages should be pre-
vented. All wise and healthful regulations in this direc-
tion prohibiting such marriages as far as practicable
would tend to the prevention of pauperism and crime,
1CAnEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AIERICAN DIVORCE (1932) 15. See
also XXX CURRENT HISTORY 276-82; III HowARD, HISTORY OF MATBIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1904) 254; III PUBLIATIONS oF T= A mRIoAN SOCIOLOGICAL
SOCIETY 159; LiCHTENBERGER, DIVORCE, A STUDY nr SOCIAL CAUSATION
(1909) 97.
'GoODSELL, PROBLEmS OF THE FAmILY 442, note 9; RICHMOND AND HALL,
CHILD MARRIAGES (1925) 58.
8LAUGHLIN, DULLETIN 10A, EUGENICS RECORD OFiCE (1922) 14-15. See
also MAY, MENTAL DISEASES (1922) 25; (1934) XXIV Am. Jou. PUB.
HEALTH 1011-12; (1929) VII HYGEiA 250-254.
'4 Wash. 470, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699 (1892).
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and the transmission of hereditary diseases and defects,
and it may not be regarded as too chimerical to say that
in the future laws may be passed looking to this end. Cer-
tainly it is a legitimate subject for legislation, for the
state has an interest in each act, contract, and relation
of its individual members that in anywise affects the
public welfare, or tends to injury in various ways as
the government of man approaches greater degrees of per-
fection, and the rights, relations, and the responsibilities
of one person with regard to another, and to all others,
become better understood. Every thoughtful person would
desire this should be so, even though in some cases it
might seem to result in individual hardship."
THE CREATION OF THE MARRIAGE STATUS IN WASHINGTON
Traditionally the marriage status has been created in one of two
ways, either by the giving of mutual consent to the union by the
parties after the manner of forming a private contract, or by
entering the contract according to the regulations prescribed by
the state. A consideration of the marriage status necessarily in-
volves an examination of the validity of the former of these two
methods, namely, the common-law marriage.
One of the earliest attempts to give marriages a certain degree
of formality and notoriety was the decree of the Lateran Council
of 1215 Innocent III, which prescribed the publishing of the bans
in all Catholic countries in western Christendom. The clandestine
marriage flourished, however, in spite of this decree. It remained
for the Council of Trent (1543-1563), representing the authority
of the Church on the continent, to outlaw the secret marriage by
declaring all marriages void unless performed in the presence of
the parish priest, according to the manner prescribed by the
Church.10 The same problem was legislated upon in England by
the passing of Lord Ilardwicke's Act, 26 Geo. II, c. 33 (1753).11
Evasion of this statute which required the publishing of the bans
and a religious ceremony, entailed the danger of punishment as
a felon and of having the marriage declared void. Since the law
did not apply to Scotland secret marriages were not entirely
abolished, for a marriage of English subjects on Scottish soil by
mere private agreement received the sanction of the English
courts which applied the law of the place of ceremony. Thus arose
the now famous Gretna Green marriages.
With the variety of religions in the American colonies, the
"JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1933) 359,
note 8. See also II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(2d ed., 1923) 369-74; Hallett v. Collins, 13 U. S. (L. Ed.) 376, 10 How.
174 (1850); KOEGEL, COMM rON LAW MARRIAGES (1922) 26.
"I HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) 435-437;
ASHTON, TiiE FLEET, 233-237, 331; KOEGEL, op. cit. supra note 10, 29-30.
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dearth of legislative control, the absence of an established church,
and the great distances which rendered access to church and clergy
quite difficult, it was natural that the c6mmon-law marriage flour-
ished. 12 Chancellor Kent in 1809 in Penton v. Reed,'8 and later
in his commentaries,'4 gave impetus to the growth of the secret
marriage in this country. In the United States today, "informal
marriages based on mutual assent, without ceremony or officiant,
have been considered valid as common-law marriages by a majority
of the States". 15
In Washington a common-law marriage is void if contracted
within the state. This rule was established by the case of In Re
McLaughlin's EstateO where the secret marriage was held to be
contrary to good morals and public policy. This policy of pre-
venting secret marriages has been somewhat weakened by later
decisions in this state which indicate that a comrnon-law marriage,
valid in the state where celebrated, and not a mere illicit and mere-
tricious cohabitation, will be recognized as valid in Washington.'7
The rule of the McLaughlin case is an important step towards
insuring permanent recordation of marriages, and it allows a de-
gree of desirable administrative control over licensing and the
ceremony which could not be obtained if the secret marriage were
recognized. There is no doubt that the common-law marriage is
socially undesirable, and most authorities on the problem would
agree with the following statement by Richmond and Hall in their
text, Marriage and the State:
"One of the arguments against allowing the conmon-
law marriage, as it is called, to circulate on a parity with
the licensed and ceremonial marriage is the fact that,
under any such double standard, statutory law and its
public administration can regulate the one and not the
other. A common-law marriage is an unlicensed and un-
recorded marriage. It is an anachronism, as we have said
"MADDEN, PERsoNs AND DO ESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 50; RICHMOND AND
HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 22, 25-26, 30; GOODSELL, PROBLEMS
OF THE FAMILY (1928) 79; III HowAuD, op. cit. supra note 11, 171-74.
"14 Johns 52, 4 Am.. Dec. 244 (1809).
12 KENT's COmm. 26.
"MAY, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS (1930) 29; I VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS (1931) § 26.
"4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699 (1892).
"Stans v. Baitey, 9 Wash. 115, 37 Pac. 316 (1894); Blodgett v. Blodgett,
109 Wash. 597, 187 Pac. 340 (1920). See also Comment (1925) I WASH.
LAW REV. 277. This rule -is in accord with the conflict of laws principle
by which the local jurisdiction recognizes the marriage as valid, if valid
in the state of ceremony and not repugnant to a strong policy of said
local jurisdiction. In Re Wilbur's Estate, 8 Wash. 35, 35 Pac. 407 (1894),
14 Wash. 242, 44 Pac. 262 (1896); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pao.
417 (1907); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 131, 140, 141; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DOmESTIc RELATIONS (1931) § 27.
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before, that such marriages continue to be recognized in
half of our states today. A further argument against
them is this: A licensed marriage on the date of its cele-
bration, or as soon thereafter as the required return is
made to the license officer, becomes a matter of per-
manent, official record, while a marriage based on consent
alone remains so nebulous, so confused and undocument-
ed, that the courts of the very states that still grant rec-
ognition to it have difficulty in deciding what consti-
tutes a common-law marriage and what does not." '18
Although Washington does not recognize the common-law mar-
riage, there is in our law the doctrine of presumption of validity
of marriage which leads to similar results. This presumption,
which arises whenever a man and woman cohabit as husband and
wife and hold themselves out openly as such, probably does in
fact operate to make valid many common-law marriages where
proof of the lack of ceremony is unavailable."9 The presumption is,
of course, rebuttable by clear evidence showing no marriage in
fact, or by such evidence as would raise grave doubts as to the
good faith of the parties so cohabiting. 20 The policy of the state,
it is believed, is best served by endeavoring to validate de facto
marriages whenever possible.21
The effect of this presumption is to detract considerably from
the force of the McLaughlin rule insofar as the latter may tend to
discourage the informal marriage. It should be noted, however,
that the presumption is applied in those cases in which a couple
have been living as man and wife. Usually the family is also com-
posed of one or more children. So far as the state is concerned,
it is better that the de facto union be recognized as a legal rela-
tionship, if this can be done without violating the McLaughlin
rule. It is better for the family to remain a self-supporting unit
IMARPrAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 293. In accord see HOWARD, HISTORY
OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) 170, 184 (1904); GOODSELL, PROBLEMS
OF THE FAMILY (1928) 441, 444.
"Summerville v. Summerville, 31 Wash. 411, 72 Pac. 84 (1903); Shank
v. Wilson, 33 Wash. 612, 74 Pac. 812 (1903); State v. Nelson, 39 Wash.
221, 81 Pac. 721 (1905); Potter v. Potter, 45 Wash. 401, 88 Pac. 625
(1907); Nelson v. Carlson, 48 Wash. 651, 94 Pac. 477 (1908); In Re
Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 96 Pac. 684 (1908), 63 Wash. 623, 116 Pac.
272 (1911); Weatherall v. Weatherall, 56 Wash. 344, 105 Pac. 822 (1909),
63 Wash. 526, 115 Pac. 1078 (1911); Potts v. Potts, 81 Wash. 27, 142 Pac.
448 (1914); In Re Emman's Estate, 117 Wash. 182, 200 Pac. 1117 (1921);
In Re Wren's Estate, 163 Wash. 65, 299 Pac. 972 (1931). State v. Wheeler,
93 Wash. 538, 161 Pac. 373 (1916), to the effect that where marriage is
an element of a crime, it must be proven explicitly, and the presumption
will not be relied upon.
-OState ex rel. Bentley v. Frenger, 158 Wash. 683, 291 Paa. 1089 (1930);
In Re Anderson's Estate, 163 Wash. 228, 171 Wash. 385, 17 P. (2d) 889
(1933).
21Summerville v. Summerville, 31 Wash. 411, 72 Pac. 84 (1903) ; Thomas
v. Thomas, 53 Wash. 297, 101 Pac. 865 (1909).
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than to have its members thrown upon public charity as a result
of a decree of nullity of marriage by the court. Only in clear cases
should the union be deemed void as a common-law marriage, for if
this means of vindicating the law be adopted too generally it would
result in social conditions even worse than those which the law is
trying to remedy.
The statutory method is the sole means of creating a valid mar-
riage in Washington. The legislature has declared marriage to be
a civil contract. 22 The state, however, is a party to the contract
to the extent that its sanction of the union must be obtained by
proper compliance -with the marriage laws, and its consent had in
order to dissolve the contract. The usual doctrines of contract law
apply to marriages, both as to formation and performance, except
as the impact of public policy and social expediency vary the rule.
Thus, for instance, the tests for capacity are different; the power
to rescind by agreement is destroyed; the power of a minor to
disclaim, if the marriage was lawfully intered into, is gone; and
the constitutional restriction against impairment by the states does
not apply.2
8
As to the age limit for entering the marriage contract, our
court has held that the common law age of twelve for females and
fourteen for males is the minimum in this state. Two statutes
have been relied upon at one time or another in attempting to
establish a higher age limit for a valid marriage in the state. The
first is that which states that marriage may be entered into by
males of the age of twenty-one and females of the age of eighteen;24
the other is the licensing section which requires parental consent
for marriages by males under twenty-one and females under eight-
een and prohibits females under the age of fifteen from obtaining
a license under any circumstances. 25 In the case of In Re Hollo-
peter,28 the parents of a fourteen-year-old girl tried unsuccessfully
to avoid her marriage to a nineteen-year-old youth who had forged
the parents' signatures in order to obtain a license. It was decided
that the marriage was valid even though the parties were under
the age at which they could obtain a license. The court said the
22V1Ws. REM. REV. STAT., § 8437: "Marriage is a civil contract which
may be entered into by males of the age of twenty-one years, and females
of the age of eighteen years, who are otherwise capable."
aMaynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654
(1888); VERNmR, op. cit. supra note 15, § 15; State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753,
7 L. R. A. 50 (D. C., Ga., 1890). The power of the state to legislate
concerning the marriage status Is inherent in its sovereignty. Maynard
v. Hill, supra; MADDEN, PERSONS AND Dom sTic RELATIONS 5.
2WAsH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8437.
"WVASH. REM. REv. STAT. § 8451.
=52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 847, 132 A. S. R. 952
(1909).
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license law was merely a regulatory one affecting licenses and in
no way established a minimum age for marrying. Although in
fact a license was obtained here, the court cited with approval
the statement that "In the absence of any express declaration that
a marriage without a license is void, the marriage is universally
held to be valid." In a later case2 7 the court again declared that
the licensing section of the code did not affect the minimum age
for entering the marriage contract.
Thus it seems clear that in Washington this decidedly low age
limit is well established as the legal minimum. Here is one point
where a change in our laws would be socially desirable; a higher
age limit is most necessary to the effective enforcement of the pol-
icy of the state in preventing marriages from being formed which
are, in many instances, doomed to failure. This view is well stated
by Professor Vernier:
"The early marriageable age sanctioned by the common
law is certainly not defensible in the light of modern
social and economic conditions. The widespread tendency
to require a higher marriageable age of consent is a recog-
nition of this fact and is one of the progressive develop-
ments in our marriage law that should be continued.' '28
There are a number of statutory disqualifications in our mar-
riage laws. One section prohibits the marriage, first, when either
party has a wife or husband living at the time of such marriage.2"
Bigamous marriages are held void ab initio,3o although a decree of
nullity will be granted to clear up doubt as to the facts and to
make a permanent record thereof in the interests of public safety."
Here, again, the state vindicates a desirable policy by the severe
method of breaking up the family unit, with the attendant harsh
results on the individuals involved. This is the traditional ap-
proach to this particular problem and, as in the case of the com-
mon-law marriage, the severity of the penalty can only be justi-
fied by the fact that it is an effective one.
"
7Cushman v. Cushman, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26 (1914).
'I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) § 29. See also HOWARD,
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (1914) xxiii, xxiv; GOODSELL, PROBLEMS OF THE
FAMILY (1928) 442; RICHMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929)
Chap. VI.
It is to be noted that the fact that a marriage may be declared void
if parties are under a minimum age may not deter violations as effectively
as the perjury law or other penalties imposed when one obtains a license
by falsification. And without a license, there is not much chance that a
couple could be married; too few officiants would run the risk of perform-
ing the ceremony without requiring a license.
-'WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8438. See id. §§ 2453-4 for criminal pen-
alties.
3OBeyrle v. Bartsch, 111 Wash. 287, 190 Pac. 239 (1920); Blodgett v.
Blodgett, 109 Wash. 597, 187 Pac. 340 (1920). See VERNIER op. cit. supra
note 15, § 46, holding this to be the American rule.3
'Beyrle v. Bartsch supra note 30. Accord: Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142
Ala. 571, 38 So. 640, 110 A. S. R. 53 (1905).
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In proper cases the court tempers the harshness of the rule. If,
for instance, a woman marries in good faith without knowing of
her husband's legal incapacity due to an existing valid marriage,
she may secure an annulment and an equitable distribution of the
property mutually acquired during cohabitation.2 If there are
two conflicting marriages before a court, the person asserting the
validity of the second marriage is aided by a rebuttable presump-
tion that the second marriage is valid, and that the first was dis-
solved by death or divorce.3 3 This presumption is based on the
probability that in fact one already married will not marry a
second time. Being a presumption of innocence, it achieves the
policy of validating matrimonial unions wherever possible.
Subsections two and three of this section 4 relate to the prohi-
bition against marriage within the prohibited degrees. Subsec-
tion two prohibits marriages where "the parties thereto are nearer
of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or
half blood, computing by the rules of civil law." Subsection three
makes it unlawfid for any man to marry his father's or mother's
sister, his own daughter or sister, his granddaughter, or his niece;
likewise a woman is enjoined from marrying her father's or
mother's brother, her own son or brother, her grandson or her
nephew. Although not expressly declared void, these unlawful
marriages are so offensive to the courts that they are regarded as
void.235 As in the case of the common-law and bigamous marriages,
the severe penalty is held to be justified by the policy which it
protects.
While the rigorous adherence to these traditional doctrines of
our domestic law follow perhaps from the social concept of decency,
at the same time society does make certain thoughtless sacrifices,
namely, the bastardization of the children of such relationships.
Perhaps it would be better under all aspects of this section3 8 to
uIn Re Brenchley's Estate, 96 Wash. 223, 164 Pac. 913 (1917); Powers
v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 Pac. 1080 (1921). These cases follow the
doctrine laid down by the case of Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96
Pac. 1079, 126 A. S. R. 900 (1908), to the effect that the inherent powers
of a court of equity justifies a division of -property acquired by the two
spouses during cohabitation, even though there be no valid marriage
before the court to be dissolved, as would be the case in a divorce suit.
"Donofrio v. Donofrio, 167 Wash. 80, 8 P. (2d) 966 (1932); Spears
v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S. W. (2d) 875 (1928); Doertch v. Folwell
Engineering Co., 252 Mich. 460, 231 N. W. 40 (1930); Phillips v. Wilson,
298 Mo. 186, 250 S. W. 408 (1923). It is submitted that this presumption
Is almost Impossible for one asserting the priority and continued validity
of the first marriage to overcome. It means proving a negative, . e., that
no death or divorce occurred in any jurisdiction.
"'WAsH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8438. See id. § 2455 for criminal penalties.
r'Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500, 26 A. L. R. (N. s.) 179(1910).
*'WAsH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8438.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
follow the practice of some states and make bigamy grounds for
divorce.3 An even more satisfactory solution would be to adopt a
law whereby the decree of nullity of marriage carries with it a
provision for legitimizing all children born of the union." There
would still be left the severe criminal penalties of incest and big-
amy to deter wrongdoers.3 9
A second regulatory statute setting forth disqualifications reads
as follows:
"No woman under the age of forty-five years, or man
of any age, except he marry a woman over the age of
forty-five, either of whom is a common-drunkard, habitual
criminal, insane person, or person who has theretofore
been afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis in its advanced
stages, or any contagious venereal disease, shall hereafter
intermarry or marry any other person within this state. "40
Marriages in violation of this section have been held voidable at
worst, although the policy of holding a marriage of first cousins
void and one between persons afflicted with the above-mentioned
diseases voidable is debatable. It is difficult to distinguish which
union would have the more socially disastrous results. In the case
of In Re Hollingsworth's Estate4 our court held the marriage of a
feeble-minded woman was not void because of violation of this law,
stating that "a marriage between persons of a class that the statute
simply says shall not marry,4 2 that statute being provided by a
provision of a regulatory sort, and providing for punishment of
offenders, is not void in the absence of a declaration in the statute
that such marriage is void". Evidently this type of marriage is
not so offensive to the court that it will be willing to impose the
harsh penalty of a decree of nullity.
With reference to the difference in civil penalties just noted,
it may well be urged that the effect of a court's declaring a mar-
riage void or voidable will make but little difference in the pre-
vention of undesirable unions. Experience shows that certain
persons desiring to marry will continue to enter into de facto
relationships in spite of the threat of a decree of nullity of mar-
riage. They will continue to falsify facts about their health or
mental capacity. Once married, they will produce offspring re-
gardless of what a court may later decree concerning their marital
8rVENIER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAws, §§ 38, 42, 73.
"ARIz. REV. CODE ANN. (1928) § 273, an excellent example of such
a provision.
"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 2455 (incest); WAsH. REM. REV. STAT. §§
2453-54 (bigamy).
" ASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8439.
"145 Wash. 509, 261 Pac. 403 (1927), (1928) 3 WASH. LAW REV. 57.
"Author's italics.
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union. It may be concluded that the problem of preventing such
marriages must be met in its initial stages by laws enforced
through the assistance of the license issuer and the marriage offi-
ciant and backed up by the threat of criminal penalties.
In considering disqualifications for marriage, it may be well
to note one other statute of a regulatory nature, which states:
"When either party to a marriage shall be incapable
of consenting thereto, for want of legal age or a sufficient
understanding, or when the consent of either party shall
be obtained by force or fraud, such marriage is voidable,
but only at the suit of the party laboring under the dis-
ability, or upon whom' the force or fraud is imposed."143
This statute can only be available to the person suffering from
the disability; for example, the parents of either spouse are ex-
cluded from asserting the right to avoid a child's marriage.44 In
the case of Waughop v. Waughop,45 the Washington court allowed
a husband to annul a marriage which he had been induced to enter
by his wife while she, as his nurse, had him under the influence
of drugs. It was said in this decision that there can be neither
consummation n'or ratification as long as the incapacity, derange-
ment or undue influence continues, and where, as here, the hus-
band was unable to comprehend the nature of the contract, and
had not ratified it after regaining his understanding, he could an-
nul the marriage. There seems to be no reason why insanity,
idiocy, feeble-mindedness or drunkenness at the time of the cere-
mony would not also give similar grounds for annulment under
this view.4
6
The ineffectiveness of this section 47 may be observed from the
fact that the statute permits only the spouse suffering under the
disability to avoid the marriage. If that party does not wish to so
avoid, the other spouse is helpless unless possibly he or she can
assert a fraudulent concealment in the inception of the contract.
The statute fails to take into account the situation which could
exist whenever a couple disregards the inhibition of the section
prohibiting marriage where certain physical or mental ailments
exist.4 If the license issuer or the marriage celebrant fail to pre-
vent the marriage, the state can do nothing beyond inflicting
"*1WAsH. REm. REv. STAT. § 8449.
"In Re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 847
(1909).
"82 Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444 (1914).
"See In Re Gregorson's Estate, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60 (1911); Lewis
v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323 (1890); Prine v. Prine, 36 Fa. 676,
18 So. 781 (1895); note 34 L. R. A. 87, stating that non compos mentis is
required.
'rWASH. REm. REV. STAT. § 8449.
'sWASHr. REM. REv. STAT. § 8439.
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the statutory penalty. The parties, meanwhile, are permitted to
continue their relationship and to procreate defective offspring,
thus openly flouting the announced public policy of the state.
49
In addition to those already mentioned, there are certain addi-
tional criminal penalties set forth in our marriage statutes for
violations of the sections as to age and disqualifications.6 0 Perjury
as to age may result in the prosecution of the youthful offenders."
Violations of section 8439 are specifically punishable under section
8452 which provides for a fine of not more than one thousand dol-
lars or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both.
Authors Richmond and Hall have indicated several reasons for
the failure of these police measures to serve as deterrents in mar-
riage law violation cases.5 2 They cite the public indifference or
laissez faire attitude in regard to such prosecutions generally, the
reluctance of officials to prosecute unless a third party brings the
complaint, and the difficulty in securing convictions for perjury.
They propose as an alternative a greater effort to prevent these
violations in the first instance. The suggestion is a very inter-
esting one for it preserves the criminal penalty as a deterrent for
what it is worth and at the same time emphasizes prevention of
unsocial marriages by the license office in place of breaking up the
family unit by a nullity decree. Such an approach to the problem
places the license office as the primary point of control in pre-
venting marriage law violations.
THE MrARRIAGE LICENSE OFFICE-A PRIMARY POINT OF CONTROL
The license system, a comparatively recent development in the
administration of laws regulating marriage, had its origin in early
English ecclesiastical custom whereby the license of the bishop
was occasionally given to release candidates from publishing their
bans in church. As the state gradually came to assume control of
marriage on the continent and to supplant the domination of the
church in this respect, there grew up the concept of an obligatory
civil marriage to which a religious marriage was merely supple-
"One possible way out of this dilemma does exist for the sane spouse
in the case of Insanity; if the incapacitated party is Institutionalized for
five years by order of the court, then a divorce will be open to the former
party under WASH. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 982-9.
"°WASH. REbf. REV. STAT. §§ 8437, 8438, 8439.
"WASH. REm. REV. STAT. § 8451.
"MARRAGE AND THE STATE, Chap. 14, § 3, Penalties. See also, Brooks,
Marriage and Divorce in Aimrica (1905) LXXXIV FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW
334, stating: "The greatest abuse of all in American marriage laws is
that in nearly one-half of the states they have been construed by the
courts as 'directory' and not 'mandatory' . . . until it is rigorously de-
creed that no marriage contracted within the borders of a state is valid
unless all the forms and conditions prescribed by the laws of that state
have been complied with, the first essential improvement Is wanting."
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mentary. England and America, however, adopted the dual or
optional concept of the marriage ceremony, with a choice of a
civil or religious ritual. From" necessity, therefore, these latter
countries seized upon the marriage license as a means of central-
izing some degree of control in the state. With minor exceptions,
states now require all persons contemplating marriage to obtain
a proper license.53
Statutes governing the duties of the license issuer in Washing-
ton are few in number and far from specific as to his powers and
duties. Under one section the couple is to secure a marriage license
from the county auditor authorizing any person or religious organ-
ization or congregation to join them in marriage." Although
Washington does not recognize the common-law marriage, it rec-
ognizes a marriage solemnized before a person having apparent
authority to perform the duties of a minister or civil officiant
even though no license has been obtained; in other words, if the
marriage is otherwise valid, absence of a license appears not to
invalidate the marriage.5
The section which is the source of all the license issuer's powers
and duties, reads as follows:
"The county auditor, before a marriage license is is-
sued, upon the payment of a license fee of two dollars,
shall require each applicant therefor to make and file in
his office upon blanks to be provided by the county for
that purpose, an affidavit showing that such applicant is
not feeble-minded, an imbecile, epileptic, insane, a com-
mon drunkard, or afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis
in its advanced stages; Provided, that in addition, the
affidavit of the male applicant for such marriage license
shall show that such male is not afflicted with any con-
tagious venereal disease. He shall also require an affi-
davit of some disinterested credible person showing that
neither of said persons is a habitual criminal, and that
the female is over the age of 18 and the male is over
the age of 21 years; Provided that if the consent in
writing is obtained of the father, mother, or legal guard-
5'LARE-AGE AND THE STATE, Op. cit. supra note 28, 17-19, 45.
6WAsH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8450.
r'Weatherall v. Weatherall, 56 Wash. -344, 105 Pac. 822 (1909), 63
Wash. 526, 115 Pac. 1078 (1911). See also MArtIAGE AND THE STATE, op.
cit. supra note 15, 41-42, stating: ".... unlicensed marriages, though for-
bidden, are not invalid for that reason unless the state law specifically
declares them to be so . . ." Accord: 18 1. C. L. 399.
At first glance it might seem that such a rule would remove the teeth
of the licensing law. Experience shows, however, that persons will not
generally attempt marriage without first obtaining a license, and even
If -they did, it is very improbable that a marriage officiant would attempt
a ceremony without first demanding the license, since failure on the lat-
ter's part to comply with the marriage laws subjects him to a severe
penalty.
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ian of the person for whom the license is required, the
license may be granted in cases where the female is
under the age of 18 years or the male is under the age
of 21 years; Provided, that no consent shall be given,
nor license issued, unless such female be over the age of
15 years. Such affidavit may be subscribed and sworn
to before any person authorized to administer oaths.
Anyone knowingly swearing falsely to any of the state-
ments contained in the affidavits mentioned in this act
shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished as pro-
vided by the laws of the state of Washington." 6"
In addition to the penalty for perjury contained in the above sec-
tion, section 8453, Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat., also applies here, penal-
izing any person, including the license issuer, for violating any of
the provisions of that section." Before delivering the license, the
auditor must enter in his marriage record a memorandum of the
names of the parties, the consent of parent or guardian, if any,
the names of the affiants, the substance of the affidavits upon
which said license is issued, and the date of the license5 8 These
comprise the duties of the license issuer.
The total fee of three dollars, two dollars being required for the
license, 9 and one dollar for the marriage certificate,60 goes into
the county treasury, the county officers receiving a salary in full
compensation for their services.61 This feature of our marriage
laws is a valuable adjunct to the proper administration of the
marriage statutes inasmuch as the existence of the fee system for
marriage license issuance induces collusion between the issuer
and the officiant and leads to the commercializing of marriages, a
practice which forces a conscientious issuer to relinquish income
in order to promote the welfare of the state.62
In a survey conducted by the writer among the various license
offices throughout the state, twenty counties out of thirty-nine re-
turned answers to twenty-six specific questions asked of them con-
cerning the function of their offices in administering marriage
"'WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8451,
UState v Wilson, 83 Wash. 419, 145 Pac. 445 (1915). Because of the
inability of the common law definition of perjury to cover this violation,
the state has made a specific penalty under this statute. See also general
penalties for nonfeasance in office, WASH. REM. REv. STAT., §§ 2268, 2269.
"
8WAs. REM. REV. STAT. § 8453. See also WASH. REM. REV. STAT. §§
1372-77, requiring the clerk of the court to keep a record of marriages;
§ 1276 providing for the restoration of lost records. Cushman v. Cush-
man, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26 (1914), designates § 8451 as "only a regu-
lation concerning the issuance of a license to marry and in no wise af-
fecting the marriage status."
3WAsH. REM[. REv. STAT. § 8451.
'
0 VASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8446.
"See WASH. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 4105, 4211, relating to collection and
deposit of fees.
12RIC O D AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 342.
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laws. The conclusions reached from some of these returns will be
briefly reviewed in order to designate certain specific problems in-
the matter of license issuance procedure.
• Definition of issuers' powers and duties---use of implied powers.
Outside of the limited provisions of our statutes, there appears
to be no further definition of the duties of a license issuer. There
is no central state bureau which disseminates information relative
to the enforcement of these laws. Most of the auditors' offices
stated that they felt compelled to grant a license in all cases uhless
the statute, as they understood it, was clearly violated. Two offices
at times relied upon advice from the local prosecuting attorney or
the attorney-general's office before granting a license in question-
able cases. Can the auditor refuse to grant a license when he feels
that the parties are under age, when a "professional" witness
appears for the couple, when one party obtained a foreign divorce
decree to dissolve a prior marriage, when the applicants are in-
toxicated, or when there is likelihood that the applicants are per-
juring themselves in their affidavits? None of the auditors reply-
ing seemed to know just how far the issuer may go in each of
these cases without subjecting himself to mandamus proceedings.
The result is a different interpretation of the duties of the license
office in each county; hence, although one county be as careful as
possible in trying to carry out the spirit of the law and refuse to
issue a license in a questionable case, the couple may easily obtain
a license in a neighboring county. It would certainly seem that
the licensing law should be more specific in defining the issuer's
powers and thus eliminate much of the uncertainty that now exists
in license offices over these questions. Richmond and Hall have
made a similar suggestion, in stating:
"In places both large and small the official charged
with this duty performs it without supervision. His ad-
ministrative procedures are standardized by nothing save
a marriage law which is usually vague as regards admin-
istrative details... Probably the greatest single advance
of all in the marriage license system of today will be
made when every state has provided for detailed state
supervision of all marriage license issue and has devel-
oped among them an esprit de corps and a professional
interest in their task that is found only among a minority
of issuers." 1
6 3
Even as the situation stands today, there seems to be some lee-
way afforded the license issuer to give effectiveness to the spirit of
the licensing laws. Heavy penalties levied upon him for viola-
tions of the law suggest that he must perforce have some discre-
6AIAGE A"TH STAT, op. cit. supra note 62, 46.
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tionary powers. There is the section which requires an affidavit
from some disinterested credible person as a witness.14 This leaves
the determination of such qualifications up to the auditor and
provides him with a weapon with which to curb the activities of
the "professional" witness.6 5
That the courts, when presented with the question, are inclined
towards liberality in defining the license issuer's powers is illus-
trated by the recent New York case of Alzmann v. Maher," de-
cided in 1930. The plaintiff here sought a license to marry and
was refused the same by the deputy issuer because the latter
doubted the validity of the plaintiff's Mexican divorce decree, a
certified copy of which was produced at the license office. Advice
from the corporation counsel's office was relied upon by the dep-
uty. The lower court held that mandamus could be brought
against the clerk since it was not for him "to inquire into the
efficacy of the decree of a sister state or even a foreign tribunal
for the purpose of determining whether there exists a legal im-
pediment". The Appellate Division reversed the ruling and held
that the clerk's position was in part discretionary, giving him the
right to make further inquiries to determine an applicant's right
to a license where he believes there is cause to so do. Said the
court, "While it is true that the defendant is a ministerial officer,
he is invested with a measure of judicial or quasi-judicial authority
• . . It would be inconsistent for a court of this state to direct an
officer to issue a marriage certificate [license?] -when the known
facts would justify an indictment and conviction for bigamy if
the marriage were contracted."
Proof of age. This problem is one of the most difficult facing the
license issuer today; six of our auditors regard it as the most
troublesome situation confronting them in their endeavor to com-
ply with the law. It seems that with the growing efficiency with
'WAS11. REm. REV. STAT. § 8451.
'MARRLWGE AND THE STATE, Op. cit. supra note 62, 56-58.
"231 App. Div. 139, 246 N. Y. S. 60 (1930). A note to this case written
just after the decision of the trial court, in 30 COL. L. REV. 892, suggests
that where questions of fact are fairly easy of ascertainment, it might be
a good policy to increase the issuer's discretionary powers and lessen the
number of annulments. But the note writer queries the policy of ex-
tending this discretionary power so as to involve the clerk in puzzling
questions of law.
Another note writer in (1936) 4 U. or Cm. L. REV. 122, in criticizing
the Illinois Legislature House Bill No. 919, suggests that It should
include requirements that both parties apply for a license, documentary
proof of age, and that the license be issued in only such counties as
either or both applicants have residence. He cites with approval the
N. C. CODE ANN. No. 2503 (1935), which provides that the license issuer
must make "reasonable inquiry" and makes him subject to civil liability
to parents or guardians if he fails to exercise such care in granting
licenses.
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which birth records are being obtained and. preserved, this prob-
lem could be met by allowing the auditor to require the produc-
tion of a certified copy of a birth certificate in such cases as in
his discretion raise a question as to the proper age. This would
prevent child marriages and would not be an undue hardship
upon applicants.6
7
Manner of issuance of licenses. Administrative practices differ
widely here. The time taken for issuing the license varies from
five to twenty minutes in different counties. Issuance of licenses
out of hours occurs in many offices, often for additional remunera-
tion to the issuer for his trouble. This latter practice occurs only
a few times a month in some counties, only in emergencies in
other counties, and finally, in one county, in twenty per cent of
all cases where licenses are issued.8  As to who shall appear at
the office, no uniformity of practice was shown by the survey.
Though both parties are usually requested to appear for their
license in most counties, if their affidavits are forthcoming, they
will be able to get a license in three counties even though only
one of them appears; in eight counties, if they apply by mail; in
three offices, if they are represented by proxy; and in one county,
by any means they wish. This information is submitted to em-
phasize the lack of uniformity in practice among the county license
offices and to point out how easy it is for marriage laws to be
evaded where license issuing is so loosely carried out. The need for
standardization of procedure here is obvious.
Checking unreturned licenses. Once a license is issued it is valid
in any county in the state. Those license issuers questioned on the
point revealed that they had no way .of determining what became
of a license until a certificate of marriage is sent in to the clerk
of the court by the marriage celebrant after the ceremony. Al-
though officiants are required under penalty by statute to make
returns within thirty days after the ceremony, there has been an
all too prevalent failure by these officials to comply with the law.
The result is that many persons will be unable to prove the fact
of their marriage except by producing witnesses to the ceremony.
A more serious situation may arise, as follows: In the case of
'MICHMOND D HALL, CHILD MARIAGES (1925) 132. See also, RIciEH-
MOND AND HALL, MAPRLAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 178. A desirable verifi-
cation law Is N. Y. DoMEsric RELATIoNs LAw § 15 as amended by N. Y.
Laws 1932, c. 285, providing in part: "If the town or city clerk shall be
in doubt as to whether the applicant claiming to be over 21 years of age
Is actually over 21 years of age, he shall before issuing the license require
documentary proof as above defined."
"See R CHMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND rHE STATE (1929) 163, stat-
Ing: "The characteristic of out-of-hour applications as we have observed
them . . . suggest that a majority of them are followed by hasty mar-
riages . . .
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Meton v. State Industrial Insurance Dept.,69 a man and women
of Polish nationality applied for a license and relied on an in-
terpreter when at the license office. Not having the necessary
disinterested witness, they were given a form of an affidavit and
told to return it properly filled out by a qualified witness. The
parties never returned, but cohabited as man and wife until the
death of the husband, raising a family and believing that the form
given them was a certificate of marriage. The court decreed the
marriage void and bastardized the children of the union.
Many issuers questioned favored limiting the life of the licenses.
Better still, however, is a revision of office procedure by the license
issuer. If he were to write to the applicants after having failed
to receive a return of a marriage certificate within a few months
after issuing the license, he could inform them that if they had
been married, no record of the fact had reached his office. If the
candidates had been married, they would want a record of the fact
and would bring pressure upon the tardy officiant (whose identity
in most cases would be known only to them) and this official would
then return the certificate of marriage. Of course, if the license
had not been used, no harm would be done by the precautionary
measure.
Inter-county co-operation. According to the auditors who were
interviewed there appears to be little or no co-operation between
counties in preventing the issuance of licenses in neighboring juris-
dictions wherever a particular office refuses a license for cause.
A central "clearing house" of some description is needed for the
exchange of ideas and information, for facilitating inter-county
participation in marriage law enforcement, and for studying pro-
posed reforms in marriage legislation and making recommenda-
tions to public officials and to the legislature.
It is apparent that much remains to be done in the revising of
purely administrative procedure in the county marriage license
office. The difficulty in determining the scope of his powers and
duties, the reluctance against probing too deeply into the qualifi-
cations of candidates in any case and the obvious defects in certain
of our marriage laws has led the license issuer to regard his duties
in these matters as ministerial. The result is a laxness and ineffi-
ciency in the carrying out of the spirit of the law which compels
the conclusion that the license office is far from fulfilling its
function as the primary point of control in the enforcement of our
marriage laws.
6'104 Wash. 652, 177 Pac. 696 (1919). See also MARRIAGE AND THE
STATE, op. cit. supra note 68, 295-298.
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TiHn MARRuAGE OFmciNT-A SECONDARY PonTT OF CONROL
It is inevitable that certain important functions remain to be
performed by the marriage officiant if the state is to have adequate
marriage legislation. Participation in the marriage ceremony by
this official, whether he be a public officer or a member of the
clergy, gives him an opportunity to discourage violations of the
law. How far he will co-operate towards this end depends on a
number of things. In the case of the clergyman these factors will
be the attitude of the church of which he is a member towards the
problem, the sentiment of his congregation, and his own apprecia-
tion of the social position which he occupies. On the other hand,
if the officiant be a civil officer, .public opinion and his own sense
of civic responsibility are determining factors after the same
fashion.
By statute, the following officials may solemnize marriages in
Washington: Judges of the supreme court, judges of the several
superior courts, any regularly licensed or ordained minister or
any priest of any church or religious denomination anywhere
within the state, and justices.of the peace within their respective
counties.70 Proof of the performance of the ceremony by an author-
ized officer raises a presumption of its legality.7 1 In most states,
this policy of upholding matrimonial unions wherever possible is
also manifested by the general rule that the lack of proper author-
ity in the officiant will not nullify the marriage. 2 Such a law
has been adopted by Washington in a section to the effect that a
marriage solemnized before any person professing to have author-
ity to marry is not void, nor will its validity be in any way affected
by lack of title in the officiant, provided, however, such m'arriage
is consummated with a belief on the part of one or both spouses
that they were lawfully married.72
Another section of the statute reduces the danger of a marriage
ceremony being performed by an unauthorized person by pro-
viding a penalty for the unlawful joining in matrimony of per-
sons by one who knows he is unauthorized to so act, or for any
marriage solemnized contrary to law.74 These sections provide as
1WAsH. REm. REV. STAT. § 8441.
7State v. Nelson, 39 Wash. 221, 81 Pac. 721 (1905); McDonald v.
White, 46 Wash. 334, 89 Pac. 891 (1907).
"Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263, 134 Atl. 24 (1925); MAY, MABuTAGE
LAws Am DECISIONS (1929) 22-23; 18 I. C. L. 401.
7'WAsH. REm. REV. STAT. § 8442; hence it has been held in Weatherall
v. Weatherafl, 56 Wash. 344, 105 Pac. 822 (1909), 63 Wash. 526, 115
Pac. 1078 (1911), -that a marriage ceremony between a white man and
an Indian woman performed by an Indian chief of Christian faith, who
assumed to have authority -to unite persons in matrimony, was valid under
this type of statute.
T"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8454.
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adequate protection to the state and to the parties being married
as the lawmaker can expect at this point, at least insofar as pre-
venting unauthorized persons from marrying couples is concerned,
and in giving the benefit of any doubt as to the validity of the
marriage to the married couple.
As is consistent with our concept of the marriage relation as a
civil contract, the Washington statute provides that no particular
form of solemnization is required other than the expression of
mutual assent before an official designated by the state, in the
presence of at least two witnesses.7" This is essentially the civil
contract concept of marriage.76 And accordingly, as long as the
civil contract is validly entered into, a religious solemnization em-
bodying the formation of a contract will not invalidate the mar-
riage. 7
If the officiant has reason to know of impediments set forth
in the section relating to physical and mental disabilities, 7 s he
is enjoined from performing the ceremony.79 A violation of the law
may entail a severe penalty.80 Moreover, if he knowingly solem-
nizes a marriage contrary to statute, the general penalty provi-
sions will be inflicted for such misconduct.8 ' It should be noted
that this only applies where the officiant knows of these defects.
Experience has shown that if a couple are refused a ceremony by
one celebrant for just cause, it is comparatively easy for them to
go elsewhere for the marriage ceremony.82 These cases should never
be allowed to pass the license office in the first instance; if they
do, little can be done to notify those officials who might be later
asked to perform the ceremony.
There are certain duties placed on the marriage officiant per-
taining to the preservation of the record of the marriage, an ad-
ministrative function of great importance to the state. The person
solemnizing the marriage retains the license, 83 but he is required
to give each of the parties a marriage certificate containing cer-
tain definite information concerning the time and place of the
ceremony and the like. 4 This is an additional aid in the preserva-
'SWASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8443.
"Jones v. Jones, 18 Me. 308, 36 Am. Dec. 723 (1841).
17WASH. RE. REV. STAT. § 8448.
S-WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8439.
"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8440.
"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8452.
9"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8454.
"In Waughop v. Waughop, 82 Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444 (1914), one min-
ister refused to marry a couple where the wife as a nurse had drugged
her husband just prior to the ceremony, but the case indicates that a
marriage was easily had at another place the same evening.
"1WASii. REM. REV. STAT. § 8453.
"WASH. REEM. REV. STAT. § 8444.
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tion of the record of the ceremony, for the officiant must also
deliver to the clerk of the county where the marriage occurred a
certificate comparable to the one issued to the parties.8 5 If it
happens that the license was procured in a county other than where
the ceremony occurred, the clerk of the county of ceremony is
obliged to send a certified copy of the certificate to the county of
license issue, thus providing for a filing of this data in both
counties .
6
The provisions of this law are enforced by a penalty provided
for the willful refusal or neglect of the celebrant to make and
deliver such certificate to the county clerk.8 7 One may question
the effectiveness of the latter provision in accomplishing its pur-
pose, since it requires willful neglect to create any threat of prose-
cution, and it fails to anticipate the carelessness of officials in
simply neglecting to report these vital statistics. The county clerk,
not knowing who the official is, does not know upon whom to call
for the record.88 A possible solution to this problem has already
been mentioned, i. e., a follow-up by the auditor through the ap-
plicants themselves.
There clearly exists a need for making the ceremony in mar-
riage a more significant occasion,8 9 and this has been suggested by
one authority as a means of preventing hasty marriagesY° Other
authorities on the problem have recommended a reduction of the
number of marriage officiants in order to achieve a similar pur-
pose. Professor Howard has suggested that the law covering the
civil ceremony is too lax and that magistrates tend to commercial-
ize the entire procedure.91 As a remedy for this he urges a re-
"WASH. REx. Rnv. STAT. § 8445.
"See WASH. REm. REv. STAT. § 8446, reading: "The judge of the su-
perior court (county clerk) shall file such certificate and record the same
in the record of marriages, and the legal fee shall be one dollar, to be
paid by the person applying for the license and at the same time such
license is issued."
"WASH. REM. REV. STAT. § 8447.
"See MARRIAGE AND THE STATE, Op. cit. supra note 62, 295-299, indicat-
ing dangers from failure to follow up unreturned licenses.
"Marriage Ceremony, LXVIII Oumoox, 663-664; Changing ondtions
of Marriage, LXI INDEPENDENT 133.
9°DEALEY, THE FAMILY IN ITS SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS (1912) 106. See
also HALL AND BRooKE, AmERIcAN MARRIAGE LAWS 19-20, 139.
"III HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INsTITTIONS (1904) 189.
See I VERNIER, AMERICAN F~xiLY LAWS (1931) § 21, stating: "In the
following jurisdictions certain otherwise authorized officiants must file
their credentials or obtain a license to solemnize marriages: Ark., Del.,
D. C., Hawaii, Ky., Maine, Mass., Minn., Nev., N. H., N. Y., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., R. I., Va., W. Va., and Wis. Massachusetts requires churches or
other religious bodies, to file information in regard to officiants with the
state secretary."
Notice the law of Massachusetts (G. L. 1921, c. 207, § 36, as amended
by Mass. Laws, 1929, c. 169, p. 189, and § 39, as amended by Mass. Laws,
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duction in the number of civil officials authorized to perform the
ceremony, thus adopting the practice of France, Germany and
England. Richmond and Hall suggest that a reduction of civil
officials is to be advocated where inadequate check is had upon
them, as is the case in most states, and where the fees derived
by justices of the peace constitute a major portion of their in-
come, thus lending to the commercialization of marriage. They
also recommend central marriage bureaus in large cities and the
prohibition of advertising by marriage officiants 2
The importance of the marriage officiant's function in represent-
ing the state at the formation of the marital union cannot be
overestimated. The office, which most certainly should not be con-
ferred upon those who would commercialize the marriage cere-
mony for personal profit, must be fulfilled with dignity and with
a sense of responsibility to the state. In the achievement of proper
marriage law administration, this position is a point of control
second only to that of the license office itself.
DESIRABLE TRENDS IN MARRIAGE LEGISLATION
In a number of the states and territories of the United States,
outstanding laws of various kinds have come into existence during
recent years, aimed primarily at definite problems raised by inade-
quate marriage legislation. More important among such are the
medical certification law, the law providing for advance notice
of intention to marry coupled with certain residential require-
ments, sterilization laws, and interstate co-operation in the en-
forcement of the marriage laws of the separate states.
As is true in Washington, most states have declared certain
physical and mental ailments to be disqualifications for marriage.
To follow the method adopted in our state, however, of merely
requiring the parties to the intended union to swear in their affi-
davits at the license office that they are not feeble-minded or af-
flicted with a contagious disease, is to make but a gesture towards
enforcing these laws designed to protect public health. Several
states have taken decisive steps to give effect to such laws by
rquiring medical certification as a prerequisite to the obtaining
of a marriage license.9 3
120, 1926): ". . . the governor may in his discretion designate a justice of
the peace in each town and such further number, not exceeding one for
every 5,000 inhabitants of a city or town, as he considers expedient to
solemnize marriages . . ." Properly exercised, this discretionary power
should be a means of eliminating commercializing of marriage by these
officiants.
'MARRIAGE AND THE STATE, op. cit. supra note 62, 229, 237-238. VERNMP,
op. cit. supra note 91, § 21, cites Kentucky, Maryland, and Massachusetts
as legislating against officiants' advertising or soliciting marriage busi-
ness.
"'The following states have medical certification laws: Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. (1931) §§ 245.10, 245.11; Ala., ALA. Aui. CODE (1928), §§ 1156, 57;
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A leading test case of the early Wisconsin Eugenics Law, Peter-
son v. Widule,14 established the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion on the grounds that it was a proper exercise of police power
by the state. The court gave considerable encouragement to the
new law by stating that mathematical exactness in the medical
tests was not required, and that certain reasonable leeway must
be allowed the state in the matter of its administration of the
law. This progressive step by the Wisconsin legislature gave
rise to much public debate on the problem, with not a small num-
ber of the medical profession soundly condemning the ad-minis-
trative provisions of the law. 5 The result was a subsequent amend-
ment for the purpose of correcting the more obvious defects. As
revised, the law has been said to have conferred a distinct benefit
on the state, in spite of inherent defects. It has brought to the
public attention a question vital to the welfare of all and many
persons have been convinced of the desirability of scientific mar-
riage legislation because of its success.9 6
If effect is to be given to the sections of the Washington law,
prohibiting marriages in cases where dangerous mental and physi-
cal defects exist,97 we should consider the adoption of a medical
certification law of some description. Before doing so, however,
there should be a well-planned campaign throughout the state to
enlist the support of the medical profession and civic and religious
organizations, in order that the public may be enlightened as to
the policy underlying such a statute and that intelligent discus-
sion be brought to bear on the subject before an act is sent to the
legislature for final approval. Without a general desire for such
radical change, there is much danger that the traditional laissez
faire attitude toward such matters will prevail and that this law
will never become a reality.
Another desirable trend in recent marriage legislation is the
advance notice of intention law, the present equivalent of the
ancient custom of publishing the bans. Such a law provides for a
La., LA. LAws (1924) § 164, p. 264; N. C., N. C. AxN. CODE (1931) § 2500;
N. D., N. D. CoMP. LAws (1913) §§ 4373-78; Ore., ORE. ANN. CODE (1930)§§ 33-118 to 33-121; Wyo., Wyo. REV. STAT. ANw. (1931) §§ 103-227, 228.
Washington had a type of medical certification law in 1909, Wash.
Laws 1909, c. 174, p. 633-34: "The county auditor before a marriage
license is issued shall require each applicant therefor to file . . an affi-
davit of at least one duly licensed physician ... showing that the con-
tracting parties are not feeble-minded, imbeciles, epileptics, insane per-
sons, common drunkards, or persons afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis
in its advanced stages . . ." This law was on the statute books in the
letter, at least, until its repeal by Wash. Laws 1929, c. 23, § 1.
0'157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966, 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 778 (1914).
'HALL, MEDICAL CERTIFICATION FOR MARRIAGE (1925) 13-15.
OWIscoNsXN MEDICAL JouRN-AL 84 (July, 1923).
"'WASH. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 8439, 8440.
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waiting period either between the date of application for the
license and the date of receipt of the same, or for a period after
the issuance of the license and before the ceremony takes place."
The latter method may be dismissed from consideration with the
remark that it usually fails to achieve its intended purpose, inas-
much as unscrupulous marriage officiants often post-date the cer-
tificate and marry the parties immediately after they have pro-
cured the license.2
The other form of advance notice law is most satisfactory in
that it prevents hasty and ill-considered marriages, and also gives
the license issuer time to check vital information before issuing the
license, thus making that office a very effective point of control in
the prevention of marriage law violations. 00 When this statute is
combined with a requirement for residence within the county for
a reasonable period of time prior to the issuance of the license, it is
increasingly effective since there is more opportunity for accurate
verification where both parties or either of them are known. Pub-
licity of the application for marriage in local newspapers also
allows for interested and informed third parties to submit vital
information to the license issuer if they so desire. 10 Exceptions to
strict requirements can always be provided for, leaving this de-
eisidn to the license issuer in cases of emergency such as pre-mari-
tal pregnancy or impending death of either applicant. It is sub-
mitted that the adoption of such a law in Washington, if coupled
with an organized effort by license issuers to check important infor-
mation in each case, would go far toward reducing the number of
undesirable and illegal marriages in the state.
Sterilization, the weeding out of the outfit persons, is a valuable
asset to the state that is anxious to prevent the procreation of chil-
dren who are bound to inherit dangerous physical and mental dis-
eases. The law, applied usually to inmates of various state institu-
tions, has found its principal stumbling block to be the problem of
constitutionality. Sterilization laws have been declared unconstitu-
tional in Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, New York, New Jersey and Ore-
gon at one time or another. In Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey and Ore-
SVERwIER, op. cit. supra note 91 § 16 stating that out of 17 states
having such laws, 13 fix the interval between the date of application and
the date of license issue, three set it between the date of license issue and
date of ceremony, and one uses both methods. Washington has no such
law at the present time.
9 MARRIAGE AND THE STATE, Op. cit. supra note 62, 109, 284.
'"VFRNIER Op. cit. supra note 91, § 16; MARRIAGE AND THE STATE, Op.
cit. sitpra note 62, 52, 150, 163, 179, 183, 184.
'
0 DEALEY, THE FAMILY IN ITS SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS (1912) 106. See
also HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 91, 192; HALL AND DROOxE, AMERICAN"
MARRIAGE LAWS (1919) 18-19; (Apr. 4, 1931) CIX LITERARY DIGEST 23,
stating, "Certainly a few days to think it over will save many from
unsuitable marriages. And it may forestall many divorces."
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gon, invalid laws have later been replaced by valid laws, most of
them being modeled after the Virginia statute.10 2 The latter law
was held constitutional in one of the leading cases on the subject,
Buck v. Bell.108 Justice Holmes, in affirming an order of a Virginia
court which directed a superintendent of the State Colony of Epi-
leptics and Feeble-Minded to perform an operation of vasectomy
on a feeble-minded inmate, stated that the broad public policy of
the state in preventing the procreation of offspring doomed to
degeneracy or idiocy was adequately founded on the police powers
of the sovereignty. The argument that the act failed in its purpose
since it applied only to institutionalized defectives and not to
others, was swept aside by the court's statement that it is not for
the jurist to consider the wisdom of such legislation, and that fur-
ther, the answer to such objection here was that "the law does all
that is needed when it does all that it can." The three basic pro-
visions of the Virginia statute here upheld as insuring due process
and equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment, are
(1) the decision of a board of experts, (2) the opportunity for the
patient or legal representative thereof to defend, and (3) appeal-
to the state courts. Within these constitutional safeguards, fifteen
states, including Washington, have modeled sterilization laws; of
these states, two have had their former laws declared unconstitu-
tional. 04
In Washington, there is a statute which provides for the opera-
tion of vasectomy upon the order of the court in addition to other
punishment when one is convicted of carnal abuse of a female
under ten years of age, or rape, or shall be adjudged an habitual
criminal. 0 5 In addition to the above statute, passed in 1909, we
adopted a statute of the Virginia type in 1921, probably because,
as Professor Jacobs states it, we "realized the doubtful value of a
sterilization law as a punitive measure."' 1 6 This statute, in brief
provides for sterilization of male and female inmates of the state
insane asylums when the institutional board, after a careful inves-
tigation, shall decide it to be necessary to prevent procreation of
defective offspring or for the patient's betterment, and there
appears no probability of the patient's improving. 0 7 It is not a
"2JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON Do isTic RELATIONS (1933) 231,
note 48. See also, GOODSELL, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMMY (1928) 443; BuLLE-
rN 10 A, EUGENiCS RECORD Or-cE (1914) 62.
103274 U. S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1000 (1927).
204JACoBS, Zoo. cit. supra note 102.
"'WNsn. REm. REV. STAT. § 2287; in State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126
Pac. 75, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 512 (1912), our court held this statute consti-
tutional, inasmuch as there was no showing that the operation would in
fact subject the defendant to any marked degree of physical torture,
suffering or pain.
"JACOBS, op. cit. supra note 102, 234.
"'WAsH. REm. REV. STAT. §§ 6958-6968.
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punitive measure. Adequate provision is made for notice, hearing
and appeal, according to the doctrines of Buck v. Bell, supra. Cer-
tainly this type of legislation is a step forward. It has, of course,
met much opposition, although the constitutional objections at
least have been overcome. This new trend in weeding out the unfit
should eventually lead to more widespread checking of inheritable
diseases, thus giving actual life to the heretofore dormant public
policy underlying those sections of our code which prohibit mar-
riage where certain physical or mental impairments exist.
The suggestion made by some that there should be federal super-
vision of marriage laws is met by the answer that remoteness of
control under such a plan would persuade local officials to treat
their share of law enforcement as transferred to distant bureaus.
Since the problem is essentially a local one, community custom and
local conditions which form the background of most marriages must
be taken into consideration in shaping marriage laws.'018 From such
viewpoints, the argument to turn over the task of enforcing mar-
riage laws to the federal government carries its own refutation. A
desirable alternative to federal supervision, however, is the selection
of individual laws designed to meet the problems of the particular
state, with the addition of reciprocal marriage evasion laws among
states. If those states having lower standards will co-operate, they
may, by setting forth strict residential and advance notice require-
ments for persons from adjoining states who have crossed the state
line to be married, protect the high standards set in the adjoining
states which wish to experiment with progressive marriage legis-
lation. Applying only to residents of other states, these reciprocal
agreements would not offend the residents of the states adopting
them. This accommodation among states has been recommended
after an extensive survey of various methods of interstate adjust-
ment.1°9
A study of our marriage laws and of the public policy they are
designed to promote compels the conclusion that a revision of our
administrative practices in the matter of law enforcement is neces-
sary. Of the present marriage laws, it may perhaps be said that
they fall short of their intended purpose principally because of the
fact that they are not complete enough. Criminal penalties for
violations are plentiful, and, on the whole, as adequate as can be
'"HALL AND BROOKE, AmEIUCAN MARRIAGE LAWS (1919) 9-12; RICHmOND
AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 190-206, 337; JACOBS, op. cit.
supra note 102, 149 n.
MARRIAGE AND THE STATE, op. cit. supra note 108, 207. It is stated
in (1932) XXII A~i. JouR. oF PUTLIc HEALTH 1887: "Only eleven states
reported increased marriage rates for 1931 . . . of these, eight adjoin
states in which recent changes in marriage laws were made ...
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expected. If one is to lay emphasis, however, on the prevention of
the unsocial marriage in the first instance, rather than on the un-
satisfactory method of penalizing all parties concerned after the
damage has been done, then we should make available to the
license issuer and the marriage officiant the greatest powers possi-
ble in order that the latter may perform their duties with maximum
efficiency.
It is submitted that there is need for inter-country co-operation
in administering the licensing requirements of the law. There
should be some agency, either voluntary or public in nature, that
can act as a clearing house for information for the counties, Unifi-
cation of license office practices with the help of such agency could
then become a reality. The license laws should be improved to in-
clude more detailed information in the affidavits sworn to by both
candidates and should also be more specific as to just what the
license issuer is empowered to do in cases where he believes a viola-
tion of the law is taking place. These are improvements which need
not be delayed until the public is ready to accept them. They
pertain solely to making the law as it stands today more practicable
from an administrative point of view.
Other desirable improvements require more long-range planning.
Such are the accomplishment of inter-state co-operation toward
preventing marriage law evasion across state borders. Medical cer-
tification laws, advance notice laws and improved sterilization laws
also come within this category. Public opinion must be aroused to
the point where it will welcome these improvements, and this will,
of course, require time and public education. None the less, so im-
portant are these new trends in marriage legislation that their
adoption must be made a reality in the near future. Few reforms
can be more vital to this state than those which are directed toward
preventing the spread of physical and mental diseases to future
generations and minimizing the unfortunate consequences of fam-
ily disorganization. In bringing its marriage laws and their admin-
istration up to date, the state of Washington will make considerable
progress toward these goals.f
tCondensed from a thesis submitted for the Juris Doctor degree, Uni-
versity of Washington Law School, June, 1936.
